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Abstract
This paper determines ownership and leverage of two units facing a tax-
bankruptcy trade-off. Connected units have higher leverage and lower tax burden,
because of internal support through both bailouts and corporate dividends. Owner-
ship adjusts to additional tax provisions. A hierarchical group with a wholly-owned
subsidiary results from Thin Capitalization rules. The presence of corporate divi-
dend taxes generates horizontal groups, or a Special Purpose Vehicle, or a private
equity fund. Combinations of tax provisions contain tax savings, debt and default
in connected units. No bailout provisions, such as the Volcker rule, succeed in
reducing leverage and default.
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1 Introduction
Shareholders in control of multiple activities often own the shares of one unit through the
other, in a hierarchical group. When controlling shareholders directly hold shares in each
unit, groups are horizontal instead of hierarchical. Outsiders may own minority stakes,
but it is not unusual that the controlling entity fully owns the group. Ownership is not
the only link between units connected by common control. Quite often we observe that
one unit helps the other meet its debt obligations.1
This paper sets out to explain such types of ownership and support links, relating
them to both taxes and capital structure. High leverage is in fact commonly observed
across several types of connected activities, ranging from family groups to financial con-
glomerates. Prior literature explains higher leverage in a diversified merger, showing that
diversification allows for both higher debt and higher tax shield. However, contagion
costs may offset gains stemming from the tax shield when activities are highly risky and
display correlated cash flows (Leland, 2007). This is why a unit that supports the other,
in a group, obtains both tax shield and diversification benefits while avoiding contagion
altogether (Luciano and Nicodano, 2014).
This paper investigates the ownership possibilities of two such units that share a
common controlling entity. We call them “units”, instead of firms or banks, because
there is no explicit production or investment or intermediation activity and hence no
real synergy (as in Leland, 2007). Units own two stochastic cash flows, that stem from
future receipts from either financial assets or sales. The controlling entity could be an
entrepreneur, a family, a financial intermediary or a multinational. It may choose to own
one unit (the “subsidiary”) indirectly through the other unit (the “parent”). In case of
indirect ownership, dividends from the subsidiary help the parent in servicing its debt.
In turn, the parent may bail out its subsidiary, after meeting its own debt obligations.
Finally, each unit is subject to the tax-bankruptcy cost trade-off in that debt provides a
tax shield because interests are tax-deductible; at the same time, higher debt increases
the likelihood of costly default.
We first show conditions ensuring that support by the parent company to its sub-
sidiary is value enhancing, while dividend support to the parent is irrelevant. Ownership
irrelevance holds because the parent is optimally unlevered. The controlling entity finds
it profitable to exploit the tax shield in the supported subsidiary only, thereby protecting
1Formal and informal bailout commitments are common in parent-subsidiary structures (see Bodie
and Merton, 1992 and Boot et al., 1993) as well as in securitization (Gorton and Souleles, 2006).
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the parent from default. Subsidiary dividends affect neither the parent nor the subsidiary
default costs, leaving the tax-bankruptcy trade-off unaffected and making ownership of
the subsidiary indifferent to the controlling entity. This result indicates that a zero
leverage and a levered unit optimize the tax shield. In turn, leverage is higher than
in non-connected units if the ratio of proportional bankruptcy costs to the tax rate is
bounded above. The zero leverage unit - such as a sponsor, a financial holding company
or a fund - specializes in providing support to the highly levered unit. The latter unit
may have no ownership connection to the sponsor, as in a orphan Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV). It may be a partly owned subsidiary (as in a pyramid) or a fully owned subsidiary
(as in family firms, multinationals and private equity).
This ownership irrelevance result obtains only if there are no real synergies and no
additional tax and regulatory provisions that restrict business groups and, more generally,
connected units. Ownership irrelevance breaks down when there are taxes on dividends
distributed to the parent, the so called Intercorporate Dividend Taxes (IDT) that are
levied in the U.S.. The controlling entity avoids double taxation in two ways. One is
direct ownership in each unit, which gives rise to a horizontal group. Such ownership
structure allows to enjoy identical tax benefits, because leverage and bailout possibilities
are unaffected. A sale to third parties of the cash-flow rights of the highly leveraged,
supported unit is also value maximizing. This gives rise to a financial conduit.
Ownership irrelevance no longer holds when binding Thin Capitalization rules are
in place, as well. These are caps on interest deductions for guaranteed units, that are
common to major jurisdictions.2 If enforced in each and every connected unit, Thin Cap-
italization rules make full intercorporate ownership optimal. Indeed, the parent company
becomes levered so as to exploit the tax shield, in order to counterblance the binding cap
on subsidiary debt.3
A combination of IDT and caps on interest deductions may finally contain both tax
savings and default costs. Our simulations, calibrated following Leland(2007) to BBB-
rated firms, indicate that such combination reduces expected default costs in the group
2The UK tax authority (Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (INTM541010)) explains their rationale
as follows: “Thin capitalization commonly arises where a company is funded...by a third party...but
with guarantees...provided to the lender by another group company or companies (typically the overseas
holding company). The effect of funding a U.K. company or companies with excessive ...parentally
guaranteed debt is...excessive interest deductions. It is the possibility of excessive deductions for interest
which the U.K. legislation on thin capitalisation seeks to counteract.”
3Blouin et al. (2014) find that affiliates’ leverage responds to the introduction of Thin Capitalization
rules in US multinationals while consolidated leverage does not. Their finding is consistent with debt
shifting onto parent companies.
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to $1.02 for every 100$ of expected cash flow, as opposed to $8.13 without IDT and Thin
Capitalization rules.4 IDT and Thin Capitalization rules correspondingly increase the
tax burden of the group to $35.57, up from $25.37.5 Importantly, both tax savings and
default costs in groups become smaller than in two stand-alone, unconnected companies.
However, this combination of tax provisions is ineffective if Thin Capitalization rules
apply to proper subsidiaries of hierarchical groups only, as it often happens in practice.
In such a case, mutant ownership adjusts: subsidiaries become directly owned but preserve
their high leverage, tax shield and default costs.
This paper contributes to the theory of corporate ownership. Previous models focus
on dispersed shareholders. In Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), the entrepreneur prefers a
pyramidal structure to a horizontal group when the affiliate has lower net present value,
so as to involve outsiders in its funding. In Demsetz and Lehn (1985), ownership irrele-
vance holds because firm value is insensitive to agency costs associated with ownership
dispersion. Our paper shifts the focus from agency vis-a`-vis dispersed shareholders onto
taxes and leverage as determinants of ownership, that have so far been overlooked.
So doing, this paper also provides the first theoretical analysis of taxes targeted to
complex organizations.6 Morck (2005) argues that the introduction of IDT, which is still
present in the US tax code, improved on corporate governance during the New Deal by
discouraging pyramidal groups. Our model indicates that, when full intercorporate own-
ership is optimal prior to the introduction of IDT, a sufficiently high IDT rate transforms
a wholly-owned subsidiary into a partially owned one. Thus, IDT may give rise to a
pyramid, unless the tax rate decreases in the ownership share of the parent company.
This observation provides a rationale for the presence of this last feature in the US tax
code. Our model confirms that IDT dismantles pyramidal groups, when ownership ir-
relevance prevails prior to the introduction of IDT. Such ownership transformation does
not however affect leverage and default.7
4This estimate posits enforcement of tax rules in each unit. It overlooks the reduction in risk taking
and externalities stemming from lower leverage and default. It does not account for any liquidity or
operational improvement associated with the tax arbitrage vehicle.
5The use of non-debt tax shelters by the parent (as in De Angelo and Masulis (1980) and Graham
and Tucker (2006)) may increase these tax gains. Multinationals may additionally exploit the different
tax jurisdictions of subsidiaries (Desai et al., 2007; Huizinga et al., 2008), while our model assumes equal
tax rates so as to focus on an additional tax arbitrage.
6Several papers analyze the effect of personal dividend taxes on dividend payout, investment and
equity issues (see Chetty and Saez, 2010, and references therein), ignoring intercorporate links and
leverage. We fix payout, investment and equity issues and analyze how IDT affect intercorporate links
and leverage.
7Our analysis also advances our understanding of capital structure in connected units. It highlights
conditions ensuring that both units have positive leverage as opposed to the polarized capital structure
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Our ownership theory ignores both control issues (Zingales, 1985) and real synergies
(Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2011), in order to highlight pecuniary gains stemming from tax
arbitrage. Despite such limited focus, observations concerning ownership adjustments
that preserve the tax shield appear broadly consistent with its implications.
Like the parent company in our ownership irrelevance proposition, the private equity
fund is unlevered and contributes to debt restructurings in its highly leveraged portfolio
firms. A sizeable part of value creation by LBO deals is due to taxes (Acharya et al.,
2009; Kaplan, 1989; Renneboog et al., 2007), as in our simulations.
Taxes may explain some contrasting features of business groups in the EU and in
the US. The EU tax authorities do not tax intercorporate dividends but cap interest
deductions. EU parent units display higher leverage than their subsidiaries, and often own
100% of their affiliates (Bloch and Kremp, 1999; Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Faccio and
Lang, 2012). Moreover, the association between larger intercorporate dividend payments
with parent debt financing is visible in France (De Jong et al., 2012). In the US, instead,
intercorporate dividends are taxed unless parent ownership exceeds a high threshold.
Accordingly, evidence on family ownership (Amit and Villalonga, 2009; Masulis et al.,
2011) shows that direct control via a horizontal structure is most common in the US,
while pyramidal ownership is predominant in Europe.
Another mutation of ownership, that allows to optimally exploit the tax-bankruptcy
trade off, is a financial conduit. The guaranteed subsidiary in our model avoids Inter-
corporate Dividend Taxes - and possibly Thin Capitalization rules - but enjoys interest
deductions when outsiders own its cash-flow rights. In a financial conduit, the sponsoring
unit and investors agree upon the state contingent subsidization of the vehicle, beyond
the sponsor’s formal obligations. Conduits, that can be incorporated either as a proper
subsidiary or as an orphan SPV, are structured to be tax neutral as they would otherwise
be subject to double taxation (see Gorton and Souleles, 2006). This interpretation of our
results is supported by the observation that securitization increases with the corporate
tax rate, i.e. with incentives to exploit the tax shield (Han et al., 2015).
Our simulations suggest that subjecting SPVs to both IDT and Thin Capitalization
rules is able to limit both tax arbitrage and default costs. We also analyze the effect of “no
bailout” provisions, implied for instance by the Volcker rule, that ban bailouts of SPVs
by bank conglomerates. In such “no bailout” case, it is optimal for the parent to lever
up, because the tax shield and default costs in the subsidiary revert to the stand-alone
derived by Luciano and Nicodano (2014).
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case. Subsidiary dividends help such levered parent repay its debt. Thus its leverage is
higher than that of a comparable stand-alone unit and optimal intercorporate ownership
is 100%, when there are no corrective taxes in place. The introduction of IDT may then
reduce intercorporate ownership and dividend support, thereby leading to lower optimal
leverage. However, we show that even a lower overall leverage may deliver higher expected
default costs due to distortions in the optimal allocation of debt across units - that is too
much leverage in the subsidiary relative to the no-IDT allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and charac-
terizes optimal intercorporate ownership, bailout probability and leverage choices without
additional frictions. Section 3 examines corrective tax tools. It proves the neutrality of
IDT and studies Thin Capitalization rules. A discussion of IDT in conjunction with
either tax consolidation or a ban on bailouts follows. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are
in the Appendix. The Appendix also contrasts IDT in the US and in the EU, while we
refer to Webber (2010) and OECD (2012) for a survey of worldwide Thin Capitalization
rules.
2 The model
This section describes our modeling set-up, following Leland (2007).
At time 0, a controlling entity owns two units, i = P, S.8 Each unit has a random operating
cash flow Xi which is realized at time T . We denote with G(·) the cumulative distribution
function and with f(·) the density of Xi, identical for the two units and with g(·, ·) the
joint distribution of XP and XS. At time 0, the controlling entity selects the face value
Fi of the zero-coupon risky debt to issue so as to maximize the total arbitrage-free value
of equity, Ei, and debt, Di:
νPS = max
∑
i=P,S
Ei +Di. (1)
At time T , realized cash flows are distributed to financiers. Equity is a residual claim:
shareholders receive operational cash flow net of corporate income taxes and the face
value of debt paid back to lenders. A unit is declared insolvent when it cannot meet its
debt obligations. Its income, net of the deadweight loss due to default costs, is distributed
first to the tax authority and then to lenders.
8The subsidiary, S, can be thought of as the consolidation of all other affiliates.
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The unit pays a flat proportional income tax at an effective rate 0 < τi < 1 and
suffers proportional dissipative costs 0 < αi < 1 in case of default. Interests on debt are
deductible from taxable income.9 The presence of a tax advantage for debt generates a
trade-off for the unit: on the one side, increased leverage results in tax benefits, while on
the other it leads to higher expected default costs since – everything else being equal –
a highly levered unit is more likely to default. Maximizing the value of debt and equity
is equivalent to minimizing the cash flows which the controlling entity expects to lose in
the form of taxes (Ti) or of default costs (Ci):
min
∑
i=P,S
Ti + Ci. (2)
The expected tax burden of each unit is proportional to expected taxable income, that
is to operational cash flow Xi, net of the tax shield X
Z
i . In turn, the tax shield coincides
with interest deductions, which are equal to the difference between the nominal value of
debt Fi, and its market value Di: X
Z
i = Fi −Di. The tax shield is a convex function of
Fi.
Absent any link between units, the expected tax burden in each unit separately – each
taken as a stand-alone (SA) unit – is equal to (see Leland, 2007):
TSA(Fi) = τiφE[(Xi −X
Z
i )
+], (3)
where the expectation is computed under the risk-neutral probability10 and φ is the
discount factor. Increasing the nominal value of debt increases the tax shield, thereby
reducing the tax burden because the market value of debt, Di, increases with Fi at a
decreasing rate (reflecting higher risk).
Similarly, expected default costs are proportional to cash flows when default takes
place, i.e. when net cash flow is insufficient to reimburse lenders. Default occurs when
the level of realized cash flows is lower than the default threshold, Xdi = Fi +
τi
1−τi
Di:
CSA(Fi) = αiφE
[
Xi1{0<Xi<Xdi }
]
. (4)
Default costs represent a deadweight loss to the economy. They increase in the default cost
parameter, αi, as well as in (positive) realized cash flows when the unit goes bankrupt.
9No tax credits or carry-forwards are allowed.
10This allows to incorporate a risk premium in the pricing of assets without having to specify a utility
function.
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A rise in the nominal value of debt, Fi, increases the default threshold, X
d
i , thereby
increasing expected default costs.
The default of levered organizations triggers the default of other lending organizations,
generating additional bankruptcy costs. This externality is not captured by the above
set-up. Moreover, our full information set up with exogenous cash-flow distributions does
not account for excess risk taking induced by leverage. Thus, the above costs should be
considered a lower bound to default costs.
2.1 Intercorporate bailouts and Ownership
This section provides details on intercorporate linkages. We first model intercorporate
ownership and bailout transfers that characterize complex organizations. Next, we assess
how the two links impact on both the tax burden and default costs of the group, given
exogenous debt levels.
The parent owns a fraction, ω, of its subsidiary’ s equity. The subsidiary distributes
its profits after paying the tax authority and lenders, (XnS −FS)
+, where XnS are its cash
flows net of corporate income taxes. Assuming a unit payout ratio, the parent receives a
share ω of the subsidiary profits at time T . Let the effective (i.e. gross of any tax credit)
tax rate on intercorporate dividend be equal to 0 ≤ τD < 1. Intercorporate dividend
taxes are thus equal to a fraction ωτD of the subsidiary cash flows. The expected present
value of the intercorporate dividend net of taxes is thus equal to
ID = φωE
[
(1− τD)(X
n
S − FS)
+
]
. (5)
The cash flow available to the parent, after receiving the intercorporate dividend, increases
to
Xn,ωP = X
n
P + (1− τD)ω(X
n
S − FS)
+. (6)
Equation (6) indicates that dividends provide the parent with an extra-buffer of cash
that can help it remain solvent in adverse contingencies in which it would default as a
stand-alone company. It follows that the dividend transfer generates an internal rescue
mechanism within the unit combination, whose size increases in the parent ownership, ω,
and falls in the dividend tax rate, τD, given the capital structure.
We do not analyze personal dividend and capital gains taxation levied on shareholders
(other than the parent). We therefore assume that the positive personal dividend (and
capital gains) tax rate are already included in τ , which is indeed an effective tax rate.
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We also assume that the personal tax rate on distributions is equal across parent and
subsidiary, so as to rule out straightforward tax arbitrage between the two. Similarly,
we focus on the controlling entity’s choice of direct versus indirect ownership without
explicitly involving minority shareholders.
As for the internal bailout probability, we model it following Luciano and Nicodano
(2014). The parent chooses the probability of the ex post cash transfer to the other unit.
This promise implies a transfer equal to FS −X
n
S from the parent to its subsidiary, if the
subsidiary is insolvent but profitable (0 < XnS < FS) and if the parent stays solvent after
the transfer (XnP − FP ≥ FS −X
n
S ). Lenders perceive the promise as being honored with
probability π.
We can now show how dividends and the bailout promise affect default costs and the
tax burden of the group.
2.2 The Tax - Bankruptcy Trade-Off in Complex Organizations
We now analyze how the tax-bankruptcy trade-off changes due to intercorporate links,
i.e. the presence of a bailout in favour of the subsidiary and intercorporate ownership, ω,
given the debt levels FP , FS. Equations (3) and (4) respectively define the expected tax
burden, TSA(Fi), and default costs CSA(Fi) for each unit as a stand-alone unit. These
coincide with group values when there is zero intercorporate ownership (ω = 0) and no
bailout promise (π = 0). Default costs in the subsidiary, CS, are lower due to the bailout
transfer from the parent. Such reduction in expected default costs (Γ) is equal to
Γ = CSA(FS)− CS = παSφE
[
XS1{0<XS<XdS ,XP≥h(XS)}
]
≥ 0. (7)
Subsidiary expected default costs are lower the higher the probability of the bailout
promise and the greater the ability of the parent to rescue its subsidiary. The indicator
function 1{·} defines the set of states of the world in which rescue occurs, i.e. when both
the subsidiary defaults without transfers (first term) and the parent has sufficient funds
for rescue (second term). The function h, which is defined in the Appendix, implies that
rescue by the parent is likelier the smaller the parent debt, FP .
Subsidiary dividends impact on the parent’s default costs, as follows. The cum-
dividend cash flow in the parent – defined in equation (6) – is larger the larger is intercor-
porate ownership, ω. Such additional cash flow raises both the chances that the parent
is solvent and lenders’ recovery rate in insolvency. Expected default costs saved by the
parent, ∆C, are equal to
9
∆C = CSA(FP )− CP = αPφE
[
XP
(
1{0<Xn
P
<FP } − 1{0<Xn,ωP <FP }
)+]
≥ 0. (8)
The first (second) term in square brackets measures the parent’s cash flows that is
lost in default without (with) the dividend transfer. It is easy to show that the parent
default costs fall in dividend receipts net of taxes. These in turn increase in ω(1 − τD)
and fall in subsidiary debt.
Finally, when intercorporate dividends are taxed, the group tax burden increases
relative to the case of two stand-alone units. We denote this change as ∆T , defined as
∆T = TS + TP − TSA(FP ) + TSA(FS) = φωτDE[(X
n
S − FS)
+] ≥ 0. (9)
This is positive, and increasing in subsidiary’s dividend. In turn, dividend increases in
profits after the service of debt, (XnS − FS)
+, and in intercorporate ownership ω.
2.3 Optimal Intercorporate Links and Leverage
This section determines the capital structure (FP and FS) and intercorporate links (π, ω)
that minimizes total default costs and tax burdens of the two units (as in equation (2)),
solving
min
FS ,FP ,ω,π
TS + TP + CS + CP . (10)
Dividend taxes and other frictions are absent. Throughout the paper, we maintain the
standard technical assumption of convexity of the objective function with respect to the
face values of debt. We report the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated to the minimum
program at the beginning of Appendix B. The value-maximizing organization may result
in two stand-alone units, with no links (π∗ = 0, ω∗ = 0). It may instead be a complex
hierarchical group, with both intercorporate ownership and a bailout mechanism (π∗ > 0,
ω∗ > 0) or an organization with internal bailouts but no intercorporate ownership (π∗ > 0,
ω∗ = 0) as in horizontal groups or in subsidiaries fully financed by outsiders. Finally,
it can be a structure with partially-owned subsidiaries but no bailout promises (π∗ = 0,
ω∗ > 0)11. Before proceeding, we introduce the following lemma that summarizes the
properties of ∆C and ∆T with respect to debt levels.
11For simplicity we assume that there is no “piercing of the corporate veil” when intercorporate own-
ership reaches 100%, i.e. the parent enjoys limited liability vis-a´-vis its subsidiary’s lenders also when it
is the sole owner of its subsidiary.
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Lemma 1 Default costs of the parent are decreasing in intercorporate ownership, ω.
The additional tax burden due to intercorporate dividend taxation (when τD > 0), ∆T ,
is decreasing in subsidiary debt, insensitive to parent debt, FP , and non-decreasing in
intercorporate ownership ω.
The higher is subsidiary debt, the lower are subsidiary dividends - given its exogenous
cash flows. This implies lower taxes on intercoporate dividends. As for ownership, the
higher the share ω the lower the default costs in the parent thanks to the dividend
payment from its subsidiary. However, the tax burden associated with intercorporate
dividend increases, for a positive IDT tax rate.
The proposition below deals with the joint determination of leverage and ownership
structure, given the bailout promise.
Lemma 2 Let τD = 0. There exists a π¯ > 0 such that
(i) if π > π¯, then parent is unlevered (F ∗P = 0), the subsidiary is levered and the optimal
intercorporate ownership share is indefinite; (ii) otherwise, the parent is levered and it
fully owns its subsidiary.
Lemma 2 states that a high probability of bailout frees the parent from debt and the
associated default costs. The value of the units is therefore insensitive to intercorporate
ownership and dividend receipts, as they do not affect the tax-bankruptcy trade-off.
If the bailout is unlikely, part (ii) of Lemma 2 indicates that the value maximizing
intercorporate ownership is 100%, because subsidiary dividends help servicing debt of the
parent thereby allowing it to increase its own tax shield. Setting up two stand-alone units
(ω = 0; π = 0) is therefore sub-optimal for the controlling entity. It is also suboptimal
for the controlling entity to own directly shares in the subsidiary, and/or to allow outside
shareholders to buy subsidiary shares (ω < 1).
This lemma indicates that the bailout transfer has more marked effects than the
dividend transfer on capital structure. We trace back this characteristics to the bailout
providing a higher tax shield, because it is conditional on positive subsidiary cash flow.
This reduces the lenders’ recovery upon default and the value of debt, thereby increasing
the tax shield by more than a dividend transfer. Subsidiary dividends typically increase
the lenders’ recovery should the parent default.12
This conditional bailout differs from both internal loans and unconditional guarantees.
Both help the subsidiary service its debt, but impair the parent’s service of its own debt.
12In the model it is possible to make subsidiary payout contingent on the parent being profitable. In
the real world, parent company lenders would file a revocatory action if the parent defaults.
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Moreover, internal loans and contractual guarantees are typically not contingent on the
subsidiary’s cash flow being positive.13
It is now possible to characterize the optimal intercorporate ownership, the probability
of the bailout and the associated capital structure.
Theorem 1 Assume τD = 0. Then the bailout occurs with certainty (π
∗ = 1) and inter-
corporate ownership (ω∗) is indefinite. Moreover, optimal debt in the complex organiza-
tion exceeds the debt of two stand-alone companies if and only if the ratio of percentage
default costs to the tax rate α
τ
is lower than a constant Q.
Theorem 1 shows that the extreme capital structure in Luciano and Nicodano (2014)
carries over to any intercorporate ownership, and that a unit probability of bailout is
value maximizing. This occurs because the bailout prevents default costs from rising
faster than tax savings the more, the higher its probability.14 This result provides a
rationale for zero leverage companies (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013).
Theorem 1 is an ownership-irrelevance proposition. Due to the bailout, the controlling
entity is indifferent between sharing ownership with outsiders (by setting up a pyramidal
group with partial intercorporate ownership and partial outsiders’ ownership in the sub-
sidiary; or a horizontal group with partial outsiders’ ownership), keeping full ownership
in the affiliate (through either 100% intercorporate ownership or 100% direct ownership),
or funding the guaranteed subsidiary through outside financiers. Such irrelevance may
break down in the next sections due to the presence of corrective tax measures or a ban
on bailouts.
Agency costs of intercorporate ownership vis-a`-vis outside financiers may also subvert
ownership irrelevance. For instance, a large literature argues that the cost of outside
equity increases with intercorporate ownership when the controlling entity correspond-
ingly increases the control wedge. In such a case, the controlling entity of Theorem 1 is
indifferent between all ownership configurations but pyramidal groups. Pyramidal groups
may still be value maximizing if the controlling entity derives a compensating amount of
private benefits from intercorporate ownership per se, rather than from the separation
13In a static model, the ex-post enforcement of bailouts must rely on courts. In practice, enforcement
mechanisms vary from reputation (as in Boot et al., 1993) to the purchase of the junior tranche by the
sponsoring parent (as in De Marzo and Duffie, 1999).
14As debt shifts from the parent towards its subsidiary, the subsidiary’s tax burden increases at an
increasing rate. The interest rate required by lenders grows as they recover a lower share of their debt
in default. At the same time the bailout transfer from the unlevered parent contains the increase in the
subsidiary’s default.
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of ownership and control. We leave this extension to further research, so as to keep the
focus on taxes.
3 Tax Policy, Mutant Ownership and Financial Sta-
bility
This section analyzes the effects of additional policies on the tax burden, leverage and
distress of connected units. Such provisions may effectively address the incentives to lever
up provided by interest deductibility. The analysis starts from intercorporate dividend
taxes, as they may be able to dismantle complex organizations altogether (Morck, 2005)
through the double-taxation of dividends. It then studies the effects of “Thin Capital-
ization” rules, that directly cap interest deductions in guaranteed companies, thereby
putting an upper bound on the incentive to lever up. This section proves that these mea-
sures do not yield the level of expected tax receipts and expected default costs provided
by stand-alone units, unless they are combined. We also discuss the effects of group syn-
ergies deriving from tax consolidation. Last but not least, we explore the consequences
of a ban on internal bailouts when combined with dividend taxes.
3.1 Neutrality of Intercorporate Dividend Taxes
So far, we assumed no other tax provision beside corporate income taxes and interest
deductions. The following theorem characterizes optimal intercorporate links and capital
structure in the presence of IDT.
Theorem 2 Let the tax rate on corporate dividend be positive (0 < τD < 1). Then opti-
mal intercorporate ownership is zero (ω∗ = 0) while the capital structure and probability
of bailouts are unchanged.
Absent IDT, Theorem 1 shows that the parent may own up to 100% of subsidiary
shares, as observed in EU family firms (Faccio and Lang, 2012). Theorem 2 proves
that IDT discourages full intercorporate ownership, consistent with intuition. As soon
as the tax rate τD is non-null, optimal intercorporate ownership drops to zero so as to
avoid the double taxation of dividends. Both the sure state-contingent bailout and the
associated capital structure remain optimal. Indeed, the bailout still ensures the optimal
exploitation of the tax bankruptcy trade-off.
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A real-world counterpart of the organization envisaged by Theorem 2 is a sponsor
with its orphan SPV. In such organization, the sponsoring parent and investors agree to
the state contingent subsidization of the SPV, beyond the sponsor’s formal obligations
(see Gorton and Souleles, 2006).15 This ensures the SPV exploits the tax-bankruptcy
trade-off effectively, saving on intercorporate dividend taxes.
Another organization implied by this theorem is a horizontal group. The controlling
entity and, possibly, outside shareholders directly buy shares in both the former parent
and the former subsidiary. The latter exploits the interest deductions thanks to a bailout
guarantee from its former parent.
The following corollary summarizes the effects of IDT:
Corollary 1 The introduction of a tax on intercorporate dividend leads to the dismantling
of the hierarchical group. However, it affects neither value nor default.
In line with Morck (2005), Corollary 1 highlights the ability of IDT to dismantle hi-
erarchical groups, when the payout is inflexible and there are no real synergies deriving
from the hierarchical structure. In our setting, that abstracts from moral hazard, Corol-
lary 1 points out that dismantling the hierarchical structure (either pyramidal or with
fully owned subsidiaries) is both welfare and tax neutral.
A few remarks are useful. First, the dismantling result holds as long as the payout
ratio is positive and inflexible. Dividend payouts for corporate shareholders appear not to
adjust to corporate tax clienteles (Barclay et al., 2009; Dahlquist et al., 2014). Neutrality
is reinforced if the subsidiary payout ratio is set to zero and the parent receives subsidiary’s
profits in other ways. In such a case, dismantling the hierarchical group is unnecessary.
One way to provide funds to the parent is a subsidiary share repurchase programme, that
generates a capital gain instead of a dividend. Another way is the parent sale of assets
to its subsidiary. A third way is an inter-company loan to the parent, at below-market
rates.16
15Guarantees may take several forms - from recourse ones, to short-term loan commitments, to written
put options. Sponsoring banks typically choose indirect credit enhancement methods that minimize
capital requirements (see Jones, 2000). For instance, the junior tranche acts as guarantee for all senior
tranches. When the sponsor bank retains recourse to this tranche, which is often less than 8% of the
pool, the capital requirement is proportional to the junior tranche only and rating agencies attribute a
AAA rating to the senior tranche.
16Capital gains are subject to taxes in several jurisdictions. More generally, related-party transaction
regulation restricts the transfer of funds from the subsidiary through non-dividend distributions. For
an overview of EU member states approach see European Commission (2011), p.60. Central banks also
freeze the transfer of funds from domestic bank subsidiaries to the foreign holding company.
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Second, recall that we collapsed the personal dividend tax into the effective corporate
income tax to avoid cumbersome notation, and we set equal tax rates for parent and
subsidiary. Theorem 1, and thus the previous corollary, hold as long as the personal tax
rate on dividends from the parent is the same as the one on dividends from its subsidiary.
Otherwise, the shift from intercorporate ownership to direct ownership may no longer be
neutral.
Third, so far there are no costs associated with ownership transformations. These
can be sizeable when real synergies explain group structure. We discuss this case after
considering Thin Capitalization rules.
3.2 Thin Capitalization rules
Tax authorities know that guaranteed subsidiaries may have too little equity capital (that
is, too high leverage), due to the exploitation of the tax shield. This is why they limit
the interest deductions in guaranteed units through the so-called “Thin Capitalization”
rules. These measures directly cap interest deductions in subsidiaries or indirectly re-
strict them by constraining debt/equity ratios below a certain level. Either way, they
cause a departure from the optimal capital structure we described in previous theorems.
We now characterize the optimal capital structure following the introduction of Thin
Capitalization rules.
Theorem 3 Let the leverage constraint in the guaranteed unit be binding (F ∗∗S = K <
F ∗S) and let 0 < τD ≤ τ¯D < 1. If K ≤ K¯(αS), then the parent is optimally levered.
Furthermore:
intercorporate ownership is (a) full (ω∗ = 1) if τD = 0; (b) less than full (ω
∗ < 1) if
τD > τD, zero for τD > τ¯D.
The first part of the theorem shows that debt shifts to the parent, if debt in the
subsidiary is constrained to be lower than a level, K¯, that depends on proportional default
costs in the subsidiary. The forced reduction in subsidiary debt makes an unlevered
parent sub-optimal. Forgone gains from using the tax shield are no longer offset by tax
shield gains accruing to the subsidiary thanks to a more credible guarantee. In turn, full
intercorporate ownership ensures higher intercorporate dividends. These help the parent
repay its obligations, increasing optimal parent leverage.
The second part of the theorem states that the introduction of IDT increases the cost
of paying out dividends. For sufficiently high tax rate, the parent will no longer own all
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the shares in its subsidiary. This, in turn, may generate a pyramid if shares are sold to
outsiders.
As for the effects on distress, a cut in intercorporate dividends reduces the parent
debt for several parametric combinations. This always happens when τD > τ¯D, so that
the parent no longer holds subsidiary shares. A carefully calibrated mix of Thin Capital-
ization rules and IDT reduces default costs delivered by connected units below the level
achieved by stand-alone companies. The following theorem indicates that this is true
for certain levels of the tax rate on intercorporate dividend, τD, when subsidiary debt is
constrained to the stand-alone level.
Theorem 4 When the leverage constraint in the subsidiary is binding to the optimal
stand-alone unit level, F ∗∗S = F
∗
SA, and τD > τ¯D, the default costs of a group do not
exceed those of two stand-alone units. Moreover, the group shows both lower default costs
and higher value than the stand-alone organization.
The result of the previous theorem obtains because the parent optimal debt falls
while subsidiary debt is capped. As a direct consequence, default costs are lower than in
the stand-alone case. Moreover, the group remains more valuable than the stand-alone
organization.
This result obtains only if the tax authority enforces Thin Capitalization rules in every
formally or informally supported unit. If it limits enforcement to proper subsidiaries in
hierarchical groups, the neutrality theorem characterizing intercorporate dividend taxes
carries over to Thin Capitalization rules. The controlling entity will directly own the tax
arbitrage vehicle or will sell it to third parties so as to preserve tax gains.
Thus, Theorem 4 suggests that a mix of the two tax policies makes connected units
not only privately optimal but also (second-best) welfare optimal. In order to examine
the robustness of this conjecture, we extend our comparative analysis to the Merger (M)
using a numerical exercise proposed in Leland (2007).
Table 1 collects the parameters in our numerical analysis.17
The two units are assumed to have equally distributed Gaussian cash flows, and
equal default cost rate and tax rate. As in the previous part of the paper, we focus
on the case in which units are equal because it represents a “worst-case scenario” for
the group. Indeed, as higlighted in Luciano and Nicodano (2014), asymmetries between
17Parameters are calibrated following Leland (2007) on a BBB-rated firm. We fix the IDT tax rate,
τD, to the lowest applicable rate in the US.
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Table 1: Base-case parameters
Parameter Value
Cash-flow actual mean (µ) 100
Annual cash-flow volatility (σ) 22%
Default costs (α) 23%
Effective tax rate (τ) 20%
Intercorporate dividend tax rate (τD) 7%
Discount rate (φ) 0.7835
Table 1: This table reports the set of base-case parameters we use in all our numerical simulations, unless
otherwise stated.
units’ characteristics lead to higher value gains with respect to mergers and stand-alone
units, because the conditionality of the guarantee limits contagion costs.
Table 2 and Figure 1 report the results for ρ = 0.2. The first column of the table
refers to a merger, the second one to two stand-alone units, while the last two columns
refer to a group.
The table shows that the default costs are lower in the merger than in the two stand-alone
companies. Such gains are due to diversification benefits, that reduce its default costs
relative to stand-alone units, from 1.78 to 1.23 for every 100$ value of expected cash
flow. Yet, the merger also has higher value, thanks to higher debt (117 instead of 114)
that translates into higher tax shield.18 Group default costs are equal to 1.56 when they
are subject only to Thin Capitalization rules that constrain subsidiary debt to the stand-
alone level. Group default costs are lower than in stand-alone units, despite a much higher
face value of debt (138). However, they are higher than in the merger case (1.23), that
therefore delivers higher welfare. Groups are the value maximizing organization, with
163.88 for every 100$ value of expected cash flow, thanks to a much lower tax burden
(34.69).
When IDT is introduced along with Thin Capitalization rules (fourth column), debt
capacity in the group is limited to 112 and its default costs fall to 1.02. Also the tax
burden increases to 35.57, up from 34.69. Despite the combination of Thin Capitalization
rules and IDT, the group remains the value maximizing choice for the controlling entity,
18This is not always true. Absent tax motives, mergers are less valuable when coinsurance gains are
lower than contagion costs (Banal-Estanol et al., 2013). With a tax -bankruptcy trade-off, the merger
is less valuable than stand-alone units when cash-flow volatility is different across units and cash-flow
correlation is higher than a threshold level (Leland, 2007). The PS structure is more valuable than
the merger in those circumstances, as well as in the case of perfect cash-flow correlation (Luciano and
Nicodano, 2014).
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Table 2: Merger and PS
M SA PS, no tax policy PS, TC no IDT PS, TC+IDT
Value (ν) 163.14 162.94 166.59 (49.46; 117.13) 163.88 (120.81; 43.07) 163.36 (80.65; 82.72)
Ownership share (ω) - - indefinite 100% 0%
Default costs (C) 1.23 1.78 8.13 (0; 8.13) 1.56 (1.12; 0.44) 1.02 (0.78; 0.24)
Tax burden (T ) 35.43 35.40 25.40 (20.01; 5.39) 34.69 (16.85; 17.84) 35.57 (17.81; 17.76)
Face Value of Debt (F ) 117 114 220 (0; 220) 138 (81; 57) 112 (55; 57)
Table 2: The first two columns of this table compare the optimal properties of a merger (M column) and
of two stand-alone units (SA). The rest depict a PS structure with full commitment to bailouts, when
there are either no corrective taxes (PS, no tax); or Thin Capitalization rules only (PS, TC no IDT )
or both (PS, TC+IDT). Subsidiary debt in the last two columns is set to be lower than or equal the
stand-alone one, F ∗S ≤ 57. Optimal values of the parent and the subsidiary unit are reported in brackets.
Equity of the subsidiary is net of dividend.
who can sell its activities at 163.36 for every 100$ value of expected cash flow, as opposed
to 163.14 in the merger case.
In this case, the privately optimal organization is also second-best welfare optimal (default
costs being 1.02 vs. 1.23 in the Merger case).
Figure 1 represents the same unit combinations as the table, but adds the case of an
unregulated group with internal bailouts for comparison. This figure provides a rationale
for corrective tax policies, reporting the extent of both subsidiary leverage (220) and its
default costs (8.13) when there are no corrective tax tools. It clearly indicates that the
enforcement of the combined tax tools is able to limit financial instability.
3.3 Tax Policy and Financial Stability
This section provides more details on losses borne by lenders upon subsidiary default.
These are particularly important when the organization is a systemically relevant financial
intermediary, that acts as guarantor for securitized obligations.19 Such losses may in
fact trigger the default of a large number of financing “outsiders”, including insurance
companies and banks, thereby inducing the central bank to bail out the originator.20 We
keep on abstracting from prudential regulation of financial conglomerates (see Freixas et
al., 2007) for two reasons. On the one hand, bank capital structure responds to the tax-
bankruptcy trade-off while it is insensitive to bank-specific regulations (Gropp and Heider,
2009). On the other hand, capital requirements for SPVs were absent prior to the crisis.
Moreover, their current discretionary, risk-based application (Board of Governors, 2013)
19Sponsoring banks were providing guarantees to conduits, see Board of Governoors (2002) and
Acharya et al. (2013).
20Banks with larger holdings of even highly-rated tranches had worse performance during the crisis
(see Erel et al., 2014).
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Figure 1: This figure reports value, tax burden, debt and default costs with reference to a group with
internal bailout and 1. neither Thin Capitalization rules nor IDT (PS no TC no IDT); 2.with Thin
Capitalization rules only (PS TC no IDT); 3. with both Thin Capitalization rules and IDT (PS TC+IDT)
4. a merger (M); 5. two stand-alone firms (SA). The light part of the bars displaying PS figures refers
to the parent company.
need not restore tax receipts and contain the default costs, as the latter are independent
from both risk taking and liquidity considerations.21
Table 3 reports the endogenous default probabilities and losses upon default of Parent-
Subsidiary vehicles, along with those of both optimal stand-alone units and Mergers.
Without corrective taxes, the profitable subsidiary enjoys bailouts from its parent in
known states of the world. Despite bailouts, the subsidiary incurs into default with much
larger probability (47.38%) than a stand-alone unit (11.09%). Moreover, its lenders incur
into larger losses upon default (67.72% instead of 50.74%) because the subsidiary defaults
only when it is unprofitable.
Subjecting the subsidiary/SPV to Thin Capitalization rules helps correcting such
distortions. Thanks to a more balanced capital structure and to the parent/sponsor
support, the subsidiary default probabilities fall below (6.29%) the ones of a stand-alone
unit. However, the lenders’ loss given default (56.81%) is higher because the subsidiary
never defaults when it is profitable. At the same time, the parent is less risky than its
21De Mooji et al. (2013) also simulate the effects of new tax measures that contain aggregate bank
leverage and financial instability.
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Table 3: Tax policy and financial stability
M SA PS, no tax policy PS, TC no IDT PS, TC+IDT
Default Probability (DP ) 6.40% 11.09% 0% (0%; 47.38%) 4.25% (9.51%; 6.29%) 1.94% (10.22%; 3.85%)
Loss Given Default (LGD) 43.55% 50.74% ( - ; 67.72%) (46.86%; 56.81%) (51.11%; 61.90%)
Table 3: This table contrasts default probabilities and loss given default in the optimal configuration of
the Merger (M column), the Stand-Alone (SA column) and in the PS structures when there is no specific
tax policy (PS, no tax policy) when Thin Capitalization rules only are present (PS, TC no IDT) and
when they are coupled with IDT (PS, TC+IDT). For PS, joint default probabilities of the two units are
reported outside the brackets, which report parent and subsidiary bankruptcy likelihood respectively.
Loss given default is provided for the two units separately only.
stand-alone counterpart, despite its higher leverage, thanks to the receipt of subsidiary
dividends.
Adding IDT to Thin Capitalization rules reduces debt issuance in the parent, allowing
it to rescue more often its subsidiary. More support reduces the likelihood of default
in the subsidiary to 3.85%, because the subsidiary goes bankrupt only in very adverse
scenarios. This implies that loss given default is higher than in the absence of IDT
(61.90% vs. 56.81%). Now bailouts allow to remarkably reduce the likelihood of default
with respect to equally leveraged stand-alone companies.22 However, conditional on a
default, the percentage losses incurred in by lenders of a well capitalized subsidiary are
higher than in a stand-alone unit with identical book leverage. This is a perverse effect
of conditional bailouts that even Thin Capitalization rules and IDT cannot correct.
3.4 Hierarchical Group Synergies: Tax Consolidation
In previous sections, group affiliates exploit financial synergies only. They enjoy internal
support transfers and coordinated capital structure choices, that allow to optimize the tax
shield. Other synergies, relating for instance to investment choices (see Stein, 1997 and
Matvos and Seru, 2014) or product market competition and workers’ incentives (Fulghieri
and Sevilir, 2011) may stem from intercorporate ownership, making it less responsive to
changes in tax rates. Another group-related synergy is tax consolidation, by which a
profitable parent can use subsidiary losses to reduce its taxable income, and viceversa.23
The consolidation option is valuable because it implies that the tax burden of the group
22For instance, a stand-alone company raising the debt of the SPV when no Thin Capitalization rules
and IDT are present (220), would default 98.81% of the times instead of 47.38%.
23Tax consolidation is an option at the Federal level in the US and in other EU jurisdictions such as
France, Italy and Spain, provided intercorporate ownership exceeds some predetermined thresholds. It
is forbidden in certain jurisdictions, such as the UK and some US states.
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never exceeds the one of stand-alone units, and is typically smaller.
Tax consolidation (and other real synergies) do not affect our previous results, to the
extent that the controlling entity creates separate tax arbitrage vehicles while the rest
of the group exploits consolidation. Otherwise, the impact of consolidation on previous
results is as follows. With a minimum prescribed ownership threshold for consolidation,
ω¯ > 0, optimal intercorporate ownership can be equal to such threshold, instead of being
indefinite. This outcome depends on the correlation between operating cash flows. The
higher is the cash-flow correlation, the more valuable is the tax shield (and the associated
capital structure) relative to the tax consolidation option (and the associated capital
structure). Theorem 1 is likely to hold for sufficiently high cash-flow correlation.
The presence of IDT, together with tax consolidation, generates a trade-off concerning
the choice of ownership, ω. Increasing it up to the prescribed threshold, ω¯, lowers the tax
burden through consolidation but increases taxes paid on intercorporate dividends. Zero
intercoporate ownership is optimal unless tax consolidation synergies net of dividend taxes
exceed gains from the tax shield. This outcome is likelier, for given cash-flow correlation,
the lower is the IDT rate.
In the US, the threshold for consolidation (ω¯ = 80%)24 also triggers a zero tax rate
on intercorporate dividends. Such tax design eliminates the above-mentioned trade-off
associated with intercorporate ownership. Based on our tenet that corporate choices
respond to IDT, we expect a discontinuity in the presence of hierarchical groups above
this threshold, with larger subsidiary dividends and higher debt in parent companies.
Below this threshold, horizontal groups should be more common (La Porta et al., 1999,
Morck, 2005, Morck and Yeung (2005), and Amit and Villalonga, 2009).25
3.5 Prohibiting bailouts: welfare diminishing IDT
This section analyzes the impact of IDT on financial stability when there is no bailout
mechanism between the parent and its affiliate. This analysis sheds light on the conse-
quences of limited cash-flow verifiability by courts, when the bailout is contractual. It
also represents the outcome of recent prudential rules, because both the Volcker Rule
and the Vickers Committee limit the possibility for banking units to bail out their SPV
24A minority interest may however be sufficient for financial conduits.
25Consolidation benefits, Thin Capitalization Rules and no IDT may in turn explain the presence of
wholly-owned subsidiaries in EU non-financial groups (Faccio and Lang, 2002) as well as larger debt
raised by parent companies (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006).
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affiliates.26
Lemma 2 indicates that the parent optimally raises debt when it does not consider
bailing out its subsidiary in case of distress.27 Moreover, the parent fully owns its sub-
sidiary when it is not subject to intercorporate dividend taxation. Full intercorporate
ownership maximizes the flow of subsidiary dividend to the parent, which may use it
to honor its debt obligations. Such “dividend support” is more valuable when cash-flow
correlation is lower.
Table 4 numerically illustrates the case without IDT as cash-flow correlation varies
(second to last column). Total debt is larger, implying a larger tax shield, as correlation
falls. Yet default costs fall with correlation, despite higher debt. Default costs drop from
2.13 when ρ = 0.8 to 0.39 when ρ = −0.8. Correspondingly, total debt increases from
134 to 157. The reason is that subsidiary dividends tend to be larger, when the parent
is less profitable, the lower the correlation. Anticipating this support, lower correlation
is also associated with more debt shifting from the subsidiary onto the parent. Debt in
subsidiary (parent) equals 47(87) when ρ = 0.8, while they respectively become 25(132)
when ρ = −0.8.
The first column reports the case with IDT. A high enough dividend tax rate makes
zero intercorporate ownership optimal. Given a ban on credible bailouts, stand-alone
units emerge as the value maximizing organization for the controlling entity. The intro-
duction of IDT leads to a lower optimal debt in stand-alone organizations, yet default
costs are higher than in the connected units unless cash-flow correlation exceeds 0.5. For
lower correlation, the support provided by subsidiary dividends to the parent leads to
smaller expected default costs than in stand-alone units.
This example suggests that enforcing a ban of sponsor guarantees leads to full in-
tercorporate ownership and a more balanced capital structure. A comparison with the
previous table reveals that this ban, per se, achieves default costs that are lower than the
ones that groups generate under Thin Capitalization rules (for ρ = 0.2). Combining IDT
with a ban, however, may increase financial instability if it leads the controlling entity to
prefer stand-alone units, thus eliminating the dividend support mechanism.
26See the discussion in Segura (2014).
27In the case of securitization, Jones (2000) observes that credit risk spreads required by investors
without a guarantee from the sponsor would not allow to raise debt.
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Table 3: Welfare effects of IDT, π = 0
IDT No IDT
Cash-flow Correlation (ρ)
-0.8 -0.5 -0.2 0 0.2 0.5 0.8
Value (ν) 162.94 165.19 164.47 164.01 163.84 163.71 163.55 163.59
Parent Debt (FP ) 57 132 108 100 96 90 86 87
Subsidiary Debt (FS) 57 25 35 37 40 42 45 47
Default costs (C) 1.78 0.39 0.84 1.16 1.41 1.45 1.72 2.13
Table 4: This table reports the value, the debts and the total default costs of the complex organization
without bailout guarantee. In the first column the IDT tax rate is so high to make direct ownership
optimal. In columns 2-8 the IDT rate is zero so that the subsidiary is wholly-owned.
4 Summary and Concluding Comments
This is the first model investigating the link between tax arbitrage, ownership structure
and default. Our ownership irrelevance proposition implies that tax arbitrage vehicles
are mutant. They may be proper subsidiaries, since corporate limited liability protects
other group companies from default. They may also be sold to third parties, if such type
of ownership avoids other tax or non-tax provisions.
Tax authorities impose group-specific tax provisions to restore tax receipts, that are
curtailed by the interaction of the debt tax privilege with internal support mechanisms.
Our model shows that ownership adaptations are able to neutralize intercorporate divi-
dend taxes, as the controlling entity may directly own the levered subsidiary or may al-
ternatively sell its cash-flow rights to third parties. Thin Capitalization rules are equally
ineffective unless they are enforced in every supported unit, including the conduits owned
by third parties. If enforcement is limited to proper subsidiaries in hierarchical groups,
the neutrality theorem characterizing intercorporate dividend taxes carries over to Thin
Capitalization rules.
Strictly enforced Thin Capitalization rules are anyway unable to restore debt and
default costs to the level of stand-alone units. They result in debt shifting from the
debt-capped unit towards its parent company, that receives dividend support from its
subsidiary. A combination of both Intercorporate Dividend Taxes and Thin Capitaliza-
tion rules effectively prevents debt shifting and contains total group leverage. Expected
default costs in connected units may fall below the ones of stand-alone units, as bailouts
are no longer targeted to increase the affiliates’ tax-shield. This result offers a rationale
for the presence of both tools in the design of US tax policy.
We also study the effects of a ban on subsidiary bailouts by sponsors, which appears
in both the Volcker Rule and the UK Financial Services Act. Our analysis indicates that,
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absent bailout guarantees, parent companies lever up and fully own their affiliates and
capital structure is more balanced. In such a context, Intercorporate Dividend Taxation
may impair the stabilizing effect of the ban and may deliver higher expected default costs
even if overall debt falls.
The previous analysis does not address tax policy issues, such as the welfare rationale
behind interest deductions. It also assumes that tax authorities enforce corrective rules
so as to restore tax receipts and contain default costs. The model does not however
account for the multinational structure of several financial and non financial groups, that
may impair enforcement. On the one hand, the domestic tax authority may not be able
to enforce corrective taxes in other jurisdictions. On the other hand, it may choose not
to enforce them domestically so as to provide a subsidy to domestic firms that compete
internationally. Another possible obstacle to enforcement is complexity, especially in the
financial industry. Citigroup had over 2400 subsidiaries and 15 other systemic financial
conglomerates had more than 260, see Herring and Carmassi (2009). Lehman Brothers
Holding Inc. had 433 subsidiaries. The 2009 Joint Administrators’ progress report reveals
the net equity position of its main guaranteed European subsidiary was below 2% of the
gross book value of market positions, a striking example of a thinly capitalized unit. Our
model is also mute as to aspects already highlighted in prior literature, namely liquidity
gains brough about by securitization or operational gains in LBO portfolio firms. The tax
authority may optimally refrain from enforcing Thin Capitalization rules when expected
benefits exceed expected default costs. Future investigations may shed light on these tax
policy questions, along with the welfare rationale for a debt tax shield.
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Appendix A - Definition of the h(·) function
The function h(XS) defines the set of states of the world in which the parent company
has enough funds to intervene in saving its affiliate from default while at the same time
remaining solvent. The rescue happens if the cash flows of the parent XP are enough to
cover both the obligations of the parent and the remaining part of those of the subsidiary.
The function h(XS), which defines the level of parent cash flows above which rescue
occurs, is defined in terms of the cash flows of the subsidiary as:
h(XS) =
{
XdP +
FS
1−τ
− XS
1−τ
XS < X
Z
S ,
XdP +X
d
S −XS XS ≥ X
Z
S .
When XS < X
Z
S the cash flow XS of the subsidiary does not give rise to any tax
payment, as it is below the tax shield generated in that unit.
Appendix B - Proofs
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the minimum program
Before proving the results presented in the paper, let us provide the set of Kuhn Tucker
conditions of the minimization program (10). For notational simplicity, here and in the
following proofs we report dependence of the functions on parent and subsidiary debt
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only, specifying computations at ω∗ and π∗ when necessary.


dTSA(F
∗
P )
dFP
+
dCSA(F
∗
P )
dFP
−
∂Γ(F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FP
−
∂∆C(F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FP
−
∂∆T (F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FP
= µ1, (i)
F ∗P ≥ 0, (ii)
µ1F
∗
P = 0, (iii)
dTSA(F
∗
S)
dFS
+
dCSA(F
∗
S)
dFS
−
∂Γ(F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FS
−
∂∆C(F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FS
+
∂∆T (F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FS
= µ2, (iv)
F ∗S ≥ 0, (v)
µ2F
∗
S = 0, (vi)
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0 (vii)
−
∂∆C(F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂ω
+
∂∆T (F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂ω
= µ3 + µ4 (viii)
ω∗ − 1 ≤ 0 (ix)
ω∗ ≥ 0 (x)
µ3(ω
∗ − 1) = 0 (xi)
µ4(ω
∗) = 0 (xii)
µ3 ≤ 0, µ4 ≥ 0 (xiii)
−
∂Γ(F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂π
= µ5 + µ6 (xiv)
π∗ − 1 ≤ 0 (xv)
π∗ ≥ 0 (xvi)
µ5(π
∗ − 1) = 0 (xvii)
µ6(π
∗) = 0 (xviii)
µ5 ≤ 0, µ6 ≥ 0 (xix)
(11)
Proof of Lemma 1
The integral expressions of ∆C and ∆T read
∆C = αPφ
∫ +∞
Xd
S
∫ Xd
P
(XdP−ω(1−τD)[(1−τS)y+τXZS−FS])
+
xg(x, y)dxdy
= αPφ
∫ XdP
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
+Xd
S
Xd
S
∫ Xd
P
(XdP−ω(1−τD)[(1−τS)y+τXZS−FS])
xg(x, y)dxdy +
+ αPφ
∫ +∞
Xd
P
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
+Xd
S
∫ Xd
P
0
xg(x, y)dxdy,
∆T = φωτD
∫ +∞
Xd
S
[(1− τS)x+ τSX
Z
S − FS)]f(x)dx.
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We now compute the first derivatives of ∆C and ∆T with respect to FS and FP and we
prove our statement:
∂∆C
∂FP
= αPφ
∂XdP
∂FP
∫ +∞
Xd
S
XdP g(X
d
P , y)dy +
− αPφ
[
∂XdP
∂FP
− ω(1− τD)τS
∂XZS
∂FP
] ∫ XdP
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
+Xd
S
Xd
S
(
XdP − ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSX
Z
S − FS
])
×
× g
((
XdP − ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSX
Z
S − FS
])
, y
)
dy, (12)
∂∆C
∂FS
= αPφ
∂XdP
∂FS
∫ +∞
Xd
S
XdP g(X
d
P , y)dy +
− αPφ
[
∂XdP
∂FS
− ω(1− τD)
[
τS
∂XZS
∂FS
− 1
]]
×
×
∫ XdP
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
+Xd
S
Xd
S
(XdP − ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSX
Z
S − FS
]
)×
× g
(
y, (XdP − ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSX
Z
S − FS
]
)
)
dy,
∂∆T
∂FP
= φωτD
∂XZS
∂FP
∫ +∞
Xd
S
τSf(x)dx ≥ 0,
∂∆T
∂FS
= φωτD
[
τS
dXZS
dFS
− 1
]
(1−G(XdS)) ≤ 0.
The above expressions result from the fact that
∂XdS
∂FP
≤ 0,
∂XZS
∂FP
≥ 0.
∂∆C
∂ω
= αPφ
∫ XdP
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
+XdS
Xd
S
(1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSX
Z
S − FS]×
× (XdP − ω(1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSX
Z
S − FS])]× (13)
× g
(
XdP − ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSX
Z
S − FS
]
, y
)
dy ≥ 0.
∆C is non-decreasing in ω, as default costs saved in the parent through dividends are
higher the higher the dividend transfer from the subsidiary. The change in the tax burden
due to IDT is always non-decreasing in ω as well, as – ceteris paribus – higher dividend
taxes are paid the higher the ownership share:
∂∆T
∂ω
= φτD
∫ +∞
Xd
S
(x(1− τS) + τSX
Z
S − FS)f(x)dx ≥ 0. (14)
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This derivative takes zero value when τD = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the Kuhn Tucker conditions (i) to (xiii) in (11). We investigate the existence
of a solution in which F ∗P = 0 and F
∗
S > 0. This implies µ1 ≥ 0 and µ2 = 0. We focus
on condition (iv) first. We have to prove that the term −
∂∆C(F ∗P=0,F
∗
S)
∂FS
+
∂∆T (F ∗P=0,F
∗
S)
∂FS
has a negative limit as subsidiary debt, FS tends to zero, and a positive one when goes
to infinity, since the rest of the l.h.s. does, under the technical assumptions that xf(x)
converges as x −→ +∞ (see Luciano and Nicodano, 2014).
The derivative ∂∆C(0,FS)
∂FS
= 0 for every FS . Moreover,
∂∆T
∂FS
is always lower than or equal to
zero, and has a negative limit as FS goes to zero since limFS−→0
∂XZS
∂FS
= 1−φ(1−G(0)) > 0.
When FS goes to infinity,
∂∆T
∂FS
goes to zero as G(XdS) tends to one. Hence, we proved
that, when F ∗P = 0 there exists an F
∗
S > 0, which solves the equation that equates the
l.h.s. of condition (iv) to zero.
As for condition (i), notice that also the derivative ∂∆C
∂FP
vanishes at F ∗P = 0. Hence,
we look for conditions for the l.h.s. to be positive and set it equal to µ1 to fulfill the
condition. We know from Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that this condition is satisfied
for a certain F ∗S > 0 when π = 1 and that, when π = 0, the l.h.s. is negative at F
∗
P = 0,
because a stand-alone unit is never unlevered. Moreover, the l.h.s is increasing in π.
Thus, by continuity and convexity of the objective function, there exists a value π¯ above
which the l.h.s. is positive. π ≥ π¯ is then a necessary – and sufficient, given our convexity
assumption – condition, given F ∗S , for the existence of a solution in which F
∗
P = 0.
When π is above π¯ and τD = 0, the dividend from the subsidiary to the parent does
not affect the value of the parent, as it does not affect its default costs (∆C = 0 because
XdP = 0). Also, ∆T=0 when τD = 0. Intercorporate ownership ω has no effect on the
default costs: notice that when F ∗P = 0, condition (viii) is always satisfied, for any ω.
The tax burden of the subsidiary and its value are independent of ω: ω∗ is indefinite and
part (i) of our proposition is proved.
When π < π¯, leverage is optimally raised also by the parent as there exists no solution
in which F ∗P = 0. We consider now ω
∗ when F ∗P > 0. When ω
∗ = 0, µ4 ≥ 0, µ3 = 0.
Condition (viii) is violated, since the l.h.s. is negative at ω = 0 from (14). The existence
of an interior solution, 0 < ω∗ < 1, requires both µ3 = 0 and µ4 = 0. Condition (viii)
is satisfied only for ω∗ → ∞, which violates condition (ix). Hence, no interior solution
satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
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Finally, let us analyze the corner solution ω∗ = 1, which requires µ3 ≤ 0, µ4 = 0. Con-
dition (viii) is satisfied for appropriate µ3 and all other conditions can be satisfied at
F ∗S , F
∗
P , ω
∗ = 1. It follows that ω∗ = 1 when τD = 0 and part (ii) is proved.
Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that the probability of bailouts is equal to 1. First of all, we remark that
−∂Γ
∂π
is always negative as one can easily derive from equation (7). It follows that the
only value of π∗ that satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is π∗ = 1. If π∗ 6= 1, indeed,
the right hand side of condition (xiv) is either zero or positive, leading to violation of the
conditions. It follows then immediately from Lemma 2, part (i) that F ∗P = 0 and that ω
∗
is indefinite. As for F ∗S+F
∗
P > 2F
∗
SA if α/τ > Q, we know that F
∗
S > 2F
∗
SA if π = 1, ω = 1
and α/τ > Q (see Luciano and Nicodano (2014)). Here we have π∗ = 1, F ∗P = 0 and FS
depends on ω only trough the parent debt. Then the statement is true.
Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 1 proves that optimal PS structures, absent IDT, are characterized by π∗ = 1
and that, in that case, F ∗P = 0. Let us now introduce IDT. When τD > 0, ω
∗ = 0
is the only value of ω which does not lead to contradiction of condition (viii). In fact,
∂∆C(0,FS)
∂ω
= 0 for every FS, while
∂∆T
∂ω
is strictly positive as soon as τD > 0, leading to
contradiction unless ω∗ = 0 and hence µ3 = 0. The controlling entity who can freely select
ownership optimally sets ω∗ = 0 as soon as τD > 0, with no influence on optimal value in
the optimal arrangement. Indeed, when ω = 0 both ∆C and ∆T are 0 for every (FP , FS)
couple. Analogous discussion of the Kuhn Tucker conditions w.r.t. Lemma 2 part (ii)
allows us to state that as soon as π > π¯ there exists a solution in which F ∗P = 0, F
∗
S > 0
even when τD > 0, because ω
∗ = 0. Moreover, we know from the proof of Theorem 1 that
π∗ = 1, the result being independent of τD. As a consequence, the presence or absence
of IDT is irrelevant at the optimum for value, capital structure choices, default costs and
welfare.
Proof of Theorem 3
Before proving Theorem 3, we prove this useful lemma:
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Lemma 3 Assume F ∗P > 0 and τD > 0 and let 0 < τD ≤ τ¯D < 1. Then: i) if τD >
τD > 0, optimal intercorporate ownership is less than full (ω
∗ < 1); ii) if τD > τ¯D, then
optimal intercorporate ownership is zero (ω∗ = 0).
Proof. Let us consider first the case in which τD > 0. In particular, we look for a
condition on τD such that ω
∗ = 0. This implies µ4 ≥ 0, µ3 = 0 in (11). Condition (viii)
in (11) when ω∗ → 0 reads:
− αPφ(1− τD)
∫ +∞
Xd∗
S
[
(1− τS)y + τSX
Z∗
S − F
∗
S
]
Xd∗P g(X
d∗
P , y)dy +
+ φτD
∫ +∞
Xd∗
S
(x(1− τS) + τSX
Z∗
S − F
∗
S)f(x)dx = µ4,
where we considered that the upper limit of integration,
XdP
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
+ XdS, tends to
+∞ when ω goes to 0 and we denoted with XZ∗i and X
d∗
i for i = P, S the thresholds
evaluated at the optimum. The l.h.s. of the above equation is non-positive for τD = 0
and it is increasing in τD, since its first derivative with respect to τD is strictly positive.
It follows that a necessary condition for the existence of a solution where ω∗ = 0, for
given F ∗S and F
∗
P , is that τD is higher than a certain level τ¯D. This quantity depends on
αP , σ, ρ, τS, τH , φ, µ. If τD < τ¯D, then ω
∗ > 0. This proves part i).
Opposite considerations apply when looking for solutions where ω∗ = 1. Condition (viii),
evaluated at ω∗ = 1 is
− αPφ
∫ XdP ∗
(1−τD)(1−τS)
+Xd∗
S
Xd∗
S
(1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSX
Z∗
S − F
∗
S ]×
× (Xd∗P − (1− τD)[(1− τS)y + τSX
Z∗
S − F
∗
S ])]×
× g
(
Xd∗P − (1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSX
Z∗
S − F
∗
S
]
, y
)
dy +
+ φτD
∫ Xd∗P
(1−τD)(1−τS)
+Xd∗
S
Xd
S
(x(1− τS) + τSX
Z∗
S − F
∗
S)f(x)dx = µ3,
and µ3 ≤ 0. When τD = 0 the first term of the sum on the l.h.s. of the equation is
negative and the second disappears, whereas when τD = 1 the first term disappear, while
the second is positive. Hence, by continuity, there exists a level of τD, τD, above which
no ω∗ = 1 solution is present. Notice that under the additional assumption that g(·, ·) is
non-decreasing in the first argument below XdP , then τD ≤ τ¯D. This concludes our proof
of part ii) of the lemma.
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We now prove the first part of the theorem first. The presence of a cap on subsidiary
debt introduces a further constraint in the optimization program: F ∗∗S ≤ K, where
K is the imposed cap and (F ∗∗P , F
∗∗
S , ω
∗∗, π∗∗) denote the solution to such constrained
program. We thus consider the set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions in (11) and modify them
appropriately:
(iv)′ :
∂TSA(F
∗
S)
∂FS
+
∂CSA(F
∗
S)
∂FS
−
∂Γ(F ∗P , F
∗
S)
∂FS
−
∂∆C(F ∗P , F
∗
S)
∂FS
+
∂∆T (F ∗P , F
∗
S)
∂FS
= µ2 − µ3,
(vii)′ : µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3 ≥ 0
(xx)′ : µ3(F
∗
S −K) = 0.
Let us consider the case in which the newly introduced constraint (xx)’ is binding, so
that F ∗∗S = K. We look for the conditions under which the parent can be unlevered.
Hence, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 = 0, µ3 ≥ 0. We focus on condition (i), and we refer the reader to the
proof of Lemma 2 for the discussion of other conditions, which is immediate. Condition
(i), when F ∗∗P = 0 and F
∗∗
S = K, becomes:
− τP (1−G(0))
∂XZP (0, K)
∂FP
−
∂XZS (0, K)
∂FP
∫ +∞
Xd
S
(0,K)
τSf(x)dx+
+ αSφ
∂XdP (0, K)
∂FP
[∫ XZS (0,K)
0
xg(x,
K
1− τ
−
x
1− τ
)dx+
+
∫ XdS(0,K)
XZ
S
(0,K)
xg(x,XdS(0, K)− x)dx
]
= µ1 (15)
The first term is negative, the second as well and it is increasing in K (as XZS is
increasing and convex with respect to FP ), while the third one is null when K = 0 and
is increasing in K, since its derivative with respect to K is:
αSφ
∂XdP (0, FS)
∂FP
(
∂XdS(0, FS)
∂FS
XdS(0, FS)f(X
d
S, 0)
)
> 0.
It follows that condition (i) can be satisfied only for sufficiently high K: no solutions
with an unlevered parent exist unless K is high enough. We define as K¯(αS) the cap
above which the parent is optimally unlevered. It solves the following equation:
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αSφ
∂XdP (0, K¯)
∂FP
[∫ XZS (0,K¯)
0
xg(x,
K¯
1− τ
−
x
1− τ
)dx+
+
∫ XdS(0,K¯)
XZ
S
(0,K¯)
xg(x,XdS(0, K¯)− x)dx
]
+
−
∂XZS (0, K¯)
∂FP
∫ +∞
Xd
S
(0,K¯)
τSf(x)dx
= µ1 + τP (1−G(0))
∂XZP (0, K¯)
∂FP
Considerations similar to the unconstrained case apply to condition (iv)’, which is
met at F ∗∗S = K by an appropriate choice of µ3. Notice also that the higher αS, the lower
the required cap level K that allows for the presence of an optimally unlevered parent
company. From the proof of Lemma 2 part (ii) we know that, when τD = 0, as soon as
F ∗P > 0, the only optimal value of ω which does not violate the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
(viii) and (ix) is ω∗ = 1. Hence, ω∗∗ = 1. This concludes our proof of part a) of the
theorem.
As for part b), it follows from Lemma 3 that if τD is high enough, optimal ownership
structure, which, following previous considerations, implies ω∗∗ = 1 when τD = 0 as soon
as F ∗∗P > 0, modifies. Even when ω
∗∗ is unchanged, the dividend transfer is lowered for
fixed capital structure. The unit may adjust its capital structure choices accordingly, by
changing F ∗S and F
∗
P . For fixed capital structure, we remark that the objective function
is increasing in τD. However, overall effects on optimal value depend on τD, as well as on
other variables, and are hardly predictable. When F ∗∗S = K we simply notice that ID is
decreasing in τD, everything else fixed, as evident from equation (5).
When τD > τ¯D, we know from Lemma 3 that optimal ownership ω
∗ = 0. In such case,
ω∗∗ = 0 as well and ∆C = 0 and ∂∆C
∂FP
→ 0. In order to fulfill condition (i) if −∂∆C
∂FP
decreases, the remaining three terms of the sum of the l.h.s. must increase. Since ω∗∗
and F ∗∗S are fixed,
∂Γ
∂FP
≤ 0 (see Luciano and Nicodano, 2014) and the sum of tax burden
and default costs of the stand-alone unit is convex by assumption, FP must decrease.
This concludes our proof of part b).
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Proof of Theorem 4
We know from Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that conditional guarantees are value in-
creasing. As a consequence, as soon as π > 0, the value of the parent-subsidiary structure
is νPS(F
∗∗
P , FSA) ≥ 2νSA(FSA). We want to show that, when τD ≥ τ¯D:
2CSA(F
∗
SA) ≥ CP + CS,
which amounts to showing that:
CSA(F
∗
SA) ≥ CSA(F
∗∗
P )− Γ(F
∗∗
P , F
∗
SA)−∆C(F
∗∗
P , F
∗
SA, ω
∗∗). (16)
We know from previous considerations that the f.o.c. for a solution to the PS problem
when F ∗∗P > 0 and π = π
∗ = 1 include:
∂TSA(F
∗∗
P )
∂FP
+
∂CSA(F
∗∗
P )
∂FP
−
∂Γ(F ∗∗P , F
∗
SA)
∂FP
−
∂∆C(F ∗∗P , F
∗
SA)
∂FP
−
∂∆T (F ∗∗P , F
∗
SA)
∂FP
= 0. (17)
The equivalent equation in the stand-alone case is simply
∂TSA(F
∗
SA)
∂FSA
+
∂CSA(F
∗
SA)
∂FSA
= 0.
We also know that
∂Γ(F ∗∗P ,F
∗
SA)
∂FP
≤ 0, since the guarantee is more valuable the lower FP
is, and non-zero as soon as π > 0. Also, when τD > τ¯D, ∆C = 0 and ∆T = 0 for all FP
and FS since ω
∗ = 0. Since by our assumption TSA + CSA is convex in the face value of
debt, it follows that F ∗∗P < F
∗
SA and, as a consequence, that (16) is verified.
Appendix C - Intercorporate Dividend Taxation in US
and EU
The European Union, as well as most other developed countries, limits the double taxation
of dividends. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (1990) requires EU member states not to
tax intercorporate dividends to and from qualified subsidiaries, whose parent’s equity
stake exceeds a threshold, as small as 10% since January 2009. The Member State of
the parent company must either exempt profits distributed by the subsidiary from any
taxation or impute the tax already paid in the Member State of the subsidiary against
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the tax payable by the parent company. A 2003 amendment prescribes to impute any
tax on profits paid also by successive subsidiaries of these direct subsidiary companies.
IDT is typical of the US tax system. In order to understand the reason for its in-
troduction, scholars go back to the years following the Great Depression when Congress
promoted rules to discourage business groups. In the 1920s business groups were com-
mon in the U.S., but they were held responsible of the 1929 crisis. Morck (2005) gives
an overview of the downsides attributed to pyramids, ranging from market power to tax
avoidance through transfer pricing. During the Thirties, Congress eliminated consoli-
dated group income tax filing, enhanced transparency duties, offered tax advantages to
capital gains from sales of subsidiaries and introduced intercorporate dividend taxation.
The action of the Congress induced companies either to sell their shares in controlled
subsidiaries or to fully acquire them: by the end of the Thirties US firms were almost
entirely stand-alone companies. Today, the tax rate on intercorporate dividends is equal
at least to 7% if intercorporate ownership is lower than 80%.
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